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INTRODUCTION 
Patent litigation is a complex system wherein patent law is refined through 
interactions among the judicial system’s constituent components—principally, the 
litigants, district courts, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(Federal Circuit), Supreme Court, Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and 
Congress’s patent laws.1 Typically, litigants pore over existing laws—both 
congressional statutes and judicial opinions—to determine whether to file, defend, 
or settle a patent suit in a district court. The district court rules on the litigants’ 
claims. When prompted by a losing litigant, the Federal Circuit—the appellate 
court designated to hear nearly all appeals of patent cases2—reviews the district 
court’s decision. Finally, the Supreme Court might entertain further review if it is 
 
* Associate Professor, Fordham Law School. I thank Arnaud Ajdler, Dan Burk, T.J. Chiang, Colleen 
Chien, Kevin Collins, Daniel Crane, Susan Crawford, Dennis Crouch, John Duffy, Rebecca 
Eisenberg, Eric Goldman, Hugh Hansen, Bert Huang, Sonia Katyal, Peter Lee, Mark Lemley, Tyler 
Ochoa, Joel Reidenberg, Michael Risch, David Schwartz, Ted Sichelman, and Joshua Walker, and 
audiences at Santa Clara, University of California, Irvine, and University of Michigan law schools for 
knowledgeable comments and suggestions. 
1. Cf. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 110, 113–15 (1991) 
(applying chaos theory to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and suggesting that even though the 
Court’s decisions seem random and unpredictable, ordered patterns are nonetheless present). 
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 
535 U.S. 826, 829 (2002) (carving out a limited exception for cases in which the patent issue arises 
only in a counterclaim). 
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convinced that the case is sufficiently worthy. This interaction is not 
unidirectional. For example, the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, in 
articulating rules of patent law in its decisions, are or ought to be attentive to 
making it straightforward for the district courts to apply these rules properly.3 
Making sure that patent law develops appropriately in the courts requires attention 
to each of the principal components of the litigation system and their interactions 
with one another. 
In their recent book The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It,4 Dan 
Burk and Mark Lemley suggest that courts should and do tailor patent law to 
particular technologies or industries, with the aim of providing appropriate 
incentives to innovate under the specific circumstances. As Part I describes, their 
book understandably focuses on the Federal Circuit’s key role in this tailoring. In 
this Article, I seek to enhance their contributions by arguing that federal district 
courts—which receive less attention in their book—are also particularly crucial for 
the development and application of technology- and industry-specific patent rules. 
Although district courts’ current handling of patent litigation underperforms in 
many respects, I argue elsewhere that these flaws can be ameliorated by taking 
advantage of patentography—the geography of patent disputes—to eliminate 
forum shopping and cluster patent cases by industry or technology in those 
districts where the particular industry or technology is already geographically 
clustered.5 In Part II, I review this other work and build on it to suggest possible 
improvements to the district courts’ practices and relationships that might be 
fostered between the district courts and the Federal Circuit. These courts—two of 
the most important components in the development of patent law—could interact 
in advantageously symbiotic ways to tailor patent law to the particular needs of a 
technology or industry. In doing so, I discuss how the limitations and advantages 
of district courts and the Federal Circuit might each, respectively, be minimized 
and enhanced by treating the district courts as the Federal Circuit’s patent 
laboratories. 
I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S SUPERVISORY ROLE IN PATENT LAW 
Dan Burk and Mark Lemley make three persuasive points in their book: that 
 
3. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 805 (2008) (hypothesizing that the Federal Circuit might have molded 
its legal rules to fit the district courts’ lack of expertise in patent law); Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two 
Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 7 (2010) (hypothesizing the same). Moreover, if the Federal Circuit fears 
intervention by the Supreme Court, it might act preemptively to accede to the Supreme Court’s 
perceived demands. Andrew S. Brown, Amgen v. HMR: A Case for Deference in Claim Construction, 20 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 479, 496 n.152 (2007). 
4. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT (2009). 
5. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444 (2010). 
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the flexible patent laws ought to be applied in technology-specific ways,6 that the 
courts are the best (current) institution to do this refinement,7 and that the Federal 
Circuit is already devising some technology-specific patent rules.8 Burk and 
Lemley provide example after example of how varied technologies and industries 
protectable by patent law operate in diverse ways and thus need different forms of 
patent incentive to stimulate innovation in those areas. For instance, robust patent 
protection is more important for industries with vast research and development 
expenditures, like pharmaceuticals and semiconductors, so that they can recoup 
their investments, than for those industries spending less, like software.9 As 
another example, commercially available inventions that are self-disclosing, like 
some software and mechanical devices, are more in need of patent protection as 
they are more easily appropriable than are inventions that can be shielded, such as 
some process inventions.10 
While some might say that evidence of the technology or industry specificity 
of innovation indicates that Congress or the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
ought to provide tailored patent rules for different technologies or industries, 
Burk and Lemley argue against that position. They assert that patent statutes 
tailored by Congress for different industries would create difficult problems of 
discerning the industry to which different inventions belong.11 A profusion of 
statutes would also be costly to write and would become outdated quickly, given 
the rapid pace of technology and industry shifts.12 Moreover, tailored statutes 
could easily fall prey to special-interest lobbying, rather than serve the general 
public interest.13 In Burk and Lemley’s view, giving the PTO—the agency 
responsible principally for patent issuance—the authority to tailor patent law 
would not fare much better for similar reasons: concerns about special-interest 
lobbying and the shortsightedness of an agency currently handling only limited 
aspects of the patent system rather than infringement, licenses, and other 
disputes.14 
By contrast, Burk and Lemley argue that courts are best suited to tailor 
patent law, mostly because the antagonistic litigation process occurs in particular 
factual contexts, giving judges good information to make the best decisions about 
advancing innovation.15 They highlight a number of ways that the Federal Circuit 
 
6. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 4, at 39–92. 
7. Id. at 95–107. 
8. Id. at 109–30. 
9. Id. at 39–41. 
10. Id. at 42. 
11. Id. at 97–98. 
12. Id. at 98–99. 
13. Id. at 99–100. 
14. Id. at 106–07. 
15. Id. at 104–05. Craig Nard additionally suggests that patent law throughout American 
history has been dominated by the common law, rather than congressional action. Craig Allen Nard, 
Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51 (2010). 
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has already developed technology-specific patent rules to stimulate innovation 
properly for different technologies. For example, the Federal Circuit applies the 
patentability criterion of utility16 more strictly for biotechnology inventions than 
those in other areas out of fear that biotechnologists will seek broad patents too 
early in the research process, thereby cutting off important downstream research.17 
As another illustration, how frequently inventions are found to be nonobvious—
another patentability criterion18—depends in part on the industry in which an 
invention is created, given that it is measured by the degree of skill a person 
having ordinary skill in the art has.19 Burk and Lemley also suggest a number of 
areas in which the courts might create more technology-specific policy levers,20 
such as with regard to consideration of the cost of innovation in determining an 
invention’s nonobviousness.21 
While Burk and Lemley convincingly argue that courts ought to be 
developing industry- and technology-specific patent rules to optimize innovation 
in its varying forms, their focus is almost entirely on one court: the Federal 
Circuit.22 The Federal Circuit is, properly, a central judicial institution in any story 
about patent litigation (or patent law, for that matter). Before 1982, appeals from a 
district court’s patent decisions would go to its associated regional circuit court. 
Congress changed that by creating the Federal Circuit.23 Since 1982, appeals from 
decisions in cases in which jurisdiction arises under the patent laws lie exclusively 
in the Federal Circuit,24 as do appeals from PTO decisions on patentability.25 In 
practice, then, with few exceptions,26 the Federal Circuit is the only intermediate 
appellate court reviewing district court decisions in patent cases. Moreover, 
because the Supreme Court reviews relatively few patent cases27 and Congress 
rarely revises the patent laws other than to codify judicial decisions,28 in practice, 
 
16. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
17. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 4, at 110–12 (citing cases). 
18. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
19. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 4, at 114–17 (citing cases). 
20. Id. at 131–65. 
21. Id. at 131–33. 
22. But see id. at 137–40 (describing how district courts are working toward a rule of making 
the availability of injunctive relief dependent on the number of non-practicing entities in the relevant 
industry). Pointedly, there are twenty-seven entries in the index related to the Federal Circuit, not to 
mention many more on particular Federal Circuit cases, id. at 213, but none on district courts, id. at 
212. 
23. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006). 
25. Id. 
26. Supra note 2. 
27. The small percentage of patent decisions reviewed by the Supreme Court holds even 
taking into account a recent upsurge in the Supreme Court’s review of patent decisions. See Xuan-
Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 449, 452 (2010). 
28. Nard, supra note 15, at 53.  
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the Federal Circuit is usually the last word on patent law. 
Given its importance in patent law, Burk and Lemley’s focus on the Federal 
Circuit is understandable. The Federal Circuit was, in fact, created so that it would 
become the dominant judicial authority on patent law in two principal ways. One 
impetus to centralizing all appeals in cases arising under the patent laws in the 
Federal Circuit was to develop expertise in patent law’s complexities, thereby 
improving the law’s accuracy.29 The second was to make patent law uniform 
throughout the nation by having only one intermediate appellate court deciding 
patent cases.30 That said, as Part II demonstrates, any theory of technology and 
industry specificity in patent law should contemplate the role of district courts and 
the relationships between those courts and the Federal Circuit. 
II. DISTRICT COURTS AS THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S PATENT LABORATORIES 
Burk and Lemley’s almost exclusive focus on the Federal Circuit neglects the 
vital role the district courts—in which most patent cases originate31 and 
terminate32—ought to have in patent litigation. After demonstrating in Section A 
the district courts’ pivotal role in patent law, Section B highlights the district 
courts’ shortcomings in handling patent cases. Section C concludes with a 
discussion of how district courts might improve in this regard and how the district 
courts and the Federal Circuit might work together symbiotically—each doing 
what it institutionally does best—to advance patent law. If the district courts can 
be sufficiently bettered so as to serve as patent laboratories for the Federal Circuit, 
patent law’s refinement in the courts ought to be much improved. 
A. District Courts’ Centrality to Patent Law 
Despite being marginalized, the district courts have a vital role to play in the 
judicial development of patent law for at least three reasons. First, the district 
court is almost always the only court to play a role in the over 2,600 patent cases 
filed annually.33 Almost ninety percent of patent cases are settled in the district 
 
29. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1, 14–20 (1989). 
30. Id. at 8–14. 
31. Federal Circuit patent cases can also originate in the PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences, which can “review adverse decisions of [patent] examiners upon applications for 
patents and . . . determine priority and patentability of invention in interferences,” 35 U.S.C. § 6(b); id. 
§ 141 (permitting appeal to the Federal Circuit), or the United States International Trade Commission, 
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6) (2006). 
32. PATSTATS.ORG, District Court Disposition Modes Patent Cases FY-2008, http://www.patstats 
.org/2008fy_Patent_Case_Disposition_Modes.doc (last visited Apr. 29, 2010); infra text 
accompanying note 34. 
33. According to the Stanford Intellectual Property Litigation Clearinghouse, 2634 district 
court patent cases were filed in 2009. LEX MACHINA, http://www.lexmachina.com (last visited Sept. 
21, 2010). 
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court.34 Of the small remaining number that are adjudicated on the merits,35 only 
about half are appealed to the Federal Circuit,36 leaving the district courts as the 
final arbiters on patent law in the other half. Second, even when the Federal 
Circuit reviews a district court’s patent decision, it typically does not review all of 
the issues decided by the district court.37 Moreover, for those that it does review, 
the Federal Circuit, at least in theory, must heavily defer to the district courts’ 
factual findings, whether made by a judge in a bench trial38 or a jury in a jury 
trial.39 Because these factual determinations can strongly influence the contours of 
legal determinations in patent law, the district court’s factual findings can have a 
substantial impact on the Federal Circuit’s legal decisions. Third, if the district 
courts are doing a poor—or even an inconsistent—job at deciding patent cases, 
the Federal Circuit becomes hard-pressed to direct its resources efficiently to 
make good patent law.40 
These reasons underscore how important the district courts are to any robust 
judicial development of technology or industry specificity in patent law, as 
proposed by Burk and Lemley. For one thing, given that most district courts are 
the only judicial actor involved in nearly all patent cases, these courts have a 
critical role in ruling on the merits and guiding parties toward settlement. To 
perform these tasks properly, the district courts must succeed in three areas: (1) 
ascertaining the relevant facts in a particular case; (2) deciding whether patent law 
as already worked out—by statute or judicial construction of the statute—already 
governs the case’s facts; and (3) if not, gauging what rule should govern these 
facts. Each of these steps taken by the district courts is important to a sensible 
development of patent law’s technology or industry specificity. Germane to a 
particular patent case are many types of facts: those concerning the case itself; the 
parties’ industry (or industries), such as pharmaceutical, software, automotive, or 
retail; and the technology at issue in the relevant patent, such as biotechnology, 
software, or mechanical devices. To come to a proper legal conclusion, district 
 
34. PATSTATS.ORG, supra note 32.  
35. Id. 
36. Paul R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Meet the Challenges 
Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1193 (1999). 
37. E.g., Funai Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Daewoo Elecs. Co., 616 F.3d 1357, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Geo. M. Martin Co. v. Alliance Mach. Sys. Int’l, 618 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Ring Plus, Inc. 
v. Cingular Wireless Corp., 614 F.3d 1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010); King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 
616 F.3d 1267, 1273 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
38. Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 809–11 (1986) (per curiam) (holding 
that the Federal Circuit, like the other federal courts of appeal, must review factual findings in bench 
trials deferentially for clear error) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)). 
39. i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 849 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (ruling that jury 
verdicts—always on factual issues—will be upheld so long as supported by substantial evidence), aff’d, 
131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
40. Additionally, but less relevant here, on nonpatent issues, the choice of district court is 
elevated in importance, as regional circuit law applies and local rules can affect strategies. See Massey 
v. Del Labs., Inc., 118 F.3d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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courts must both correctly determine these facts and also focus their judicial 
spotlight on the most relevant of them. Most pertinently, district courts must gain 
sufficient understanding of the technology and industry at issue in any particular 
case to determine whether and how existing law governs that case, and if not, 
which of the plausible readings of patent law—should there be more than one—
best promotes innovation for the specific technology and industry at issue in the 
case. 
Even in the relatively infrequent case that an appeal is taken to the Federal 
Circuit, the district courts are important to patent law’s technology and industry 
specificity. That is, although the Federal Circuit will be crafting the law in a case, 
perhaps to apply particularly to the technology or industry at hand, the district 
court’s factual findings on that technology or industry ought to be receiving great 
deference. In effect, the district courts must act as the Federal Circuit’s eyes and 
ears—developing facts, determining testimonial credibility, and placing a case’s 
facts in the context of a larger legal and economic picture in the first instance. 
Finally, in their decisions, district courts can act as patent laboratories, using their 
developed factual record to experiment with and develop industry- and 
technology-specific patent rules, which the Federal Circuit could then evaluate on 
appeal. 
Given that the district courts must therefore occupy an important place in 
developing an industry- and technology-specific patent law, I now turn to whether 
the district courts are currently well-placed to do just that. 
B. Current Shortcomings of the District Courts 
Despite their centrality in patent litigation, the district courts are currently 
not well suited to help the judicial system effectuate accurate technology- and 
industry-specific patent law for at least three structural reasons. First, the factual 
decision makers in the district courts typically do not have a sufficient 
understanding of the technological and industry facts necessary to reach good 
legal decisions in patent law. Second, most district court judges do not have a 
sufficient understanding of the complexities of patent law to derive optimal legal 
conclusions from properly found facts. Third, when district court decisions are 
appealed to the Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit frequently does not grant 
sufficient deference to factual matters that have been properly found by 
mislabeling them as legal issues.41 In this section, I consider these three concerns 
in turn. 
As discussed in the previous section, critical to any accurate technology- or 
industry-specificity in patent law is having courts select which factual issues in a 
 
41. There is the additional and significant problem with plaintiff forum shopping in patent 
cases to find the most favorable district court for its case, often to the detrimental development of 
patent law, an issue I take up in Fromer, supra note 5. 
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patent case are relevant and determine those facts correctly. Recall that tailoring 
patent law to a particular technology requires both an understanding of that 
technology and the industry in which it operates to ascertain how patent law can 
best advance innovation for that technology or industry.42 For example, consider a 
sample of the many important factual issues that might need to be resolved in a 
suit over the validity and infringement of a biotechnology patent.43 To determine 
the patent’s scope, the district court must construe the patent’s claims from the 
vantage point of a person having ordinary skill in that field,44 requiring an 
understanding of what it takes for someone to be skilled in biotechnology and to 
know how that person would comprehend the patent’s claims. To ascertain 
whether infringement ought to be found beyond the patent claims’ literal meaning 
pursuant to the doctrine of equivalents, the fact finder will need to decide whether 
the alleged infringement operates in the same way as the patented invention.45 
Whether the patented invention is nonobvious—one of the patentability 
requirements46—and thus valid requires the court to decide whether a person 
having ordinary skill in biotechnology would have found the invention to be 
obvious in light of all relevant prior art.47 A court might also need to rule on 
whether the patent holder has disclosed enough information about the invention 
to satisfy patent law’s enablement requirement.48 To do so requires an 
understanding of what people having ordinary skill in biotechnology do not 
already know and cannot figure out without undue experimentation as to making 
and using the invention.49 That information must be disclosed, and if not, the 
 
42. Supra text accompanying notes 9–10. 
43. For more on the importance of factual determinations in patent cases, see Fromer, supra 
note 5, and Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
877 (2002). 
44. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The Federal 
Circuit has deemed this question to be a legal one, Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 
1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998), although I think the question is predominantly factual. See infra text 
accompanying notes 66–76. 
45. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002) 
(“The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead embraces all equivalents to the 
claims described.”). 
46. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
47. Prior art is “[k]nowledge that is publicly known, used by others, or available on the date of 
invention to a person of ordinary skill in an art, including what would be obvious from that 
knowledge.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (8th ed. 2004). As with claim construction, the courts 
consider nonobviousness to be a legal question with subsidiary factual ones. Graham v. John Deere 
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
48. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor 
of carrying out his invention.”). 
49. Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 503 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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patent is invalid.50 Moreover, embedded in these questions of claim construction, 
the doctrines of equivalents, nonobviousness, and enablement provide enough 
wiggle room for policy choices about whether upholding the particular 
biotechnology patent—and ones like it—promotes or impedes progress in the 
technology and industry. Correctly deciding these legal and policy questions 
requires a sharp and accurate understanding of the relevant technological and 
industry facts. 
In spite of the importance of accurate factual findings in patent cases, there 
is good reason to believe that the two possible decision makers in patent cases in 
district courts—judge and jury—are not well equipped to make these critical 
technology- and industry-specific factual determinations. District court judges are 
principally not technically trained—and even when they are, it is certainly not in 
every area in which patents might be granted—making it very hard for them to 
understand often complex patented technologies and the industries in which they 
occur.51 Moreover, they typically do not accrue this proficiency on the bench by 
repeated exposure to particular industries and technologies because, on average, 
they tend to handle patent cases relatively infrequently.52 
Jurors’ factual decision making seems to run into the same problems, as 
jurors typically do not have backgrounds in technological areas.53 In fact, the 
concern about juries as factual decision makers in patent cases is greater than it is 
for district court judges in bench trials. Unlike district court judges, a lay juror is 
unlikely to have repeated exposure to patent cases as a way to learn more about 
particular technologies or industries. Empirical research, moreover, suggests that 
there is cause for concern about juries’ factual determinations in patent cases. 
Kimberly Moore shows that juries are less likely to differentiate among the various 
legal challenges in a patent case by ruling in favor of the same party on all of its 
claims significantly more frequently than do judges in bench trials.54 Finally, the 
concern for jury fact-finding is further compounded by the dramatically growing 
use of juries in patent cases: from 2.5% of all tried patent cases in 1940 to 59% of 
them from 1997 through 1999.55 
Apprehensions about district courts’ role in patent litigation extend beyond 
 
50. Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1379 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
51. Rai, supra note 43, at 891–95. 
52. Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1097 (2003). 
53. See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black 
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 370–72 (2000) (describing the critique that jurors do not understand the 
technologies at issue in patent cases); Richard B. Schmitt, Juries’ Role in Patent Cases Reconsidered, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 18, 1994, at B6. 
54. Moore, supra note 53, at 403–04 (finding that, for cases involving multiple claims, juries 
resolve all of those claims in favor of the same party eighty-seven percent of the time, while judges do 
so just seventy-two percent of the time). 
55. Id. at 366. That said, a low percentage of filed patent cases—under seven percent—reach a 
trial. Id. at 383. 
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their inadequacies in fact-finding to their shortcomings in properly deciding legal 
issues in patent law. District court judges tend to lack backgrounds in patent law56 
and see patent cases rarely.57 As such, district courts are unlikely to have a good 
grasp of the law’s many intricacies.58 Pointedly, as Craig Nard observes, although 
patent law is grounded in statute, “much like the Sherman Act, [it] is a common 
law enabling statute, leaving ample room for courts to fill in the interstices or to 
create doctrine emanating solely from Article III’s province.”59 Understanding 
patent law well, then, requires a full-bodied knowledge of many Federal Circuit 
and other patent decisions, something many district court judges lack. Therefore, 
even when the facts in a patent case are properly found, there is a sizeable concern 
that the district court will nonetheless err in its legal conclusions. Given that the 
district court is more often than not the last court to make a legal ruling in a 
patent case,60 any legal missteps it makes are significant.  
Of course, these shortcomings in finding facts and deciding law should not 
be viewed in isolation. The Federal Circuit reviews some patent cases.61 As such, it 
might be seen to be in a position to correct some factual and legal errors made in 
the district court. However, that is frequently not the case. As for factual findings 
by district courts, the Federal Circuit is supposed to review them with a strong 
degree of deference. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Federal Circuit, like 
the other federal courts of appeal, must review factual findings in bench trials 
deferentially for clear error.62 Relatedly, jury verdicts—always on factual issues—
are even harder to overturn on appeal, in that they will be upheld so long as 
supported by substantial evidence.63 It is particularly hard for the Federal Circuit 
to reverse juries’ factual errors. Juries typically do not articulate their factual 
findings in any detailed way to ease appellate review. Even when special-verdict 
forms are used, the questions answered by juries are relatively general, such as, 
“Did the defendant prove the patent obvious by clear and convincing evidence?”64 
The Federal Circuit can then do not much more than “presume that the jury 
resolved the underlying factual disputes in favor of the verdict winner and leave 
those presumed findings undisturbed if they are supported by substantial 
evidence.”65 
 
56. S. Jay Plager, Challenges for Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Indeterminacy and Other 
Problems, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 77–78. 
57. Supra text accompanying notes 51–52. 
58. E.g., Steve Seidenberg, Patent Rocket Docket, 93 A.B.A. J. 38, 38 (2007). 
59. Nard, supra note 15, at 53. 
60. Supra text accompanying notes 33–36. 
61. Id. 
62. Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 809–11 (1986) (per curiam) (citing 
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)). 
63. i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 849 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 
2238 (2011). 
64. Moore, supra note 53, at 400–01. 
65. Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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That all said, there is evidence that the Federal Circuit has tended in practice 
to give too little deference to district courts’ findings in factual matters in two 
ways.66 First, there is suspicion that the Federal Circuit frequently engages in 
searching review of district courts’ factual findings.67 Second, as Arti Rai suggests, 
the Federal Circuit has mislabeled certain critical factual determinations as 
questions of law, giving the Federal Circuit the opportunity to review them de 
novo.68 Perhaps most affected in this regard is patent claim construction. Federal 
Circuit Judge Plager labels claim construction the most important issue in patent 
litigation, as its result often dictates the outcomes on infringement and validity 
issues.69 Although claim construction might simplistically seem to be about 
figuring out what the words in a patent document mean—making it seem like 
statutory interpretation, a clear question of law—it is quintessentially about 
discerning this meaning from the point of view of a person having ordinary skill in 
the relevant art at the time of invention,70 which is a significant factual 
undertaking. A district court undertaking claim construction might need to review 
testimony by scientific and industry experts and documentary evidence about the 
relevant technology, industry, and invention.71 This inquiry seems to be directed at 
discerning facts: evaluating credibility, constructing who the person having 
ordinary skill in the art is and what that person thought when the invention was 
made, and making sense of the industry, technology, and invention.72 This critique 
is so salient that six Federal Circuit judges recently suggested that the labeling of 
claim construction as a question of law ought to be revisited.73 Similar critiques 
have been aimed at various issues related to a patent’s validity, which have been 
labeled as legal despite having overwhelming factual components.74 
Any lack of deference by the Federal Circuit to the district courts on the 
facts that they have found is problematic when the district court has made sensible 
 
66. Fromer, supra note 5. 
67. Rai, supra note 52, at 885–87. An empirical study by Kimberly Moore finds that, from 
1993 through 1998, the Federal Circuit affirmed district court judges’ factual findings seventy-eight 
percent of the time and juries’ factual findings seventy-eight percent of the time as well. Moore, supra 
note 53, at 397. 
68. Rai, supra note 43, at 879. 
69. Plager, surpa note 56, at 71. 
70. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
71. Rai, supra note 52, at 1089–90. 
72. Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 802. 
73. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
Following the Supreme Court’s holding that claim construction is not a jury question because it was 
not analogous to any jury question at the United States’s founding, Markman v. Westview Instr., Inc., 
517 U.S. 370, 376–91 (1996), the Federal Circuit leaped to the conclusion that the Markman rule 
requires that claim construction be a purely legal question, Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 
1448, 1454–46 (Fed. Cir. 1998). This leap of logic was unwarranted, as something can be both a 
nonjury and factual question. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1473–78 (Rader, J., dissenting).  
74. Rai, supra note 52, at 885–87 (suggesting as much for the validity requirements of 
nonobviousness and enablement). 
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factual findings, particularly given that district courts are generally better situated 
institutionally to determine facts.75 Some, though, point to the critique that district 
courts are likely to err in finding the facts as justifying searching review by the 
Federal Circuit, a court that comparatively has a better understanding of the issues 
in patent cases.76 
In all, this section demonstrates that the district courts are not currently well 
suited to promote technology- or industry-specific development in patent law. 
Even assuming that the Federal Circuit is best situated to develop technology- and 
industry-specific patent law, as Burk and Lemley seem to suggest in their book, 
the district courts must play a strong supporting role in this development. 
Nevertheless, the district courts are currently inadequately equipped to do so. 
Whether through judge or jury, there is reason to suspect that district courts might 
not find technology- and industry-specific facts correctly, causing these courts to 
misapply the Federal Circuit’s case law. Moreover, for the reasons set forth above, 
district courts might not have a sufficiently refined understanding of the Federal 
Circuit’s legal rules and how and whether to apply them in technology- and 
industry-specific ways. Finally, in the cases in which the district courts have done a 
good job at sussing out a case’s relevant technology- and industry-specific facts, 
the Federal Circuit might improperly fail to defer to those findings. 
Even worse, the district courts—as currently structured—can hinder the 
Federal Circuit from effectively developing technology- and industry-specific 
patent rules. The district courts can err in their factual findings in ways that are 
not easily detected by an appellate court seeing a cold and established record. As 
such, the Federal Circuit might improperly rely on district courts’ factual findings 
to come to particular legal conclusions, possibly technology- and industry-specific 
ones. These conclusions may very well be unjustifiable in the face of the actual 
facts, causing an injustice in the particular case. Moreover, conclusions that are not 
well supported in fact might have a broader impact by creating opportunities for 
misapplication in future cases. For example, if the Federal Circuit is under the 
misimpression—via a district court—that little downstream research is likely in a 
particular technology, it might more readily give a broader reading to the patent’s 
claims—either literally or via the doctrine of equivalents—than it would have 
done had it known correctly that downstream research is likely. The impact of 
erroneous district court actions is further felt: even when the Federal Circuit can 
detect error in district courts’ factual findings and legal conclusions, the Federal 
Circuit’s resources are wasted if error is sufficiently widespread. In these 
situations, the Federal Circuit’s time and energy is siphoned away from focusing 
on the most complicated issues of patent law and deciding them properly. 
 
75. Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources of Appellate 
Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 650–54 (1988). 
76. Dreyfuss, supra note 29, at 47–50. 
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Moreover, Rochelle Dreyfuss suggests that the Federal Circuit might have 
molded its legal rules to fit the district courts’ lack of patent expertise, thereby 
causing harm to patent law.77 She hypothesizes that the Federal Circuit has crafted 
rigid or formalistic analytical approaches to many patent issues, such as claim 
construction and nonobviousness, because it cannot scrutinize every substantive 
outcome.78 According to Dreyfuss, this focus on district courts’ analytical 
approaches obfuscates the substantive policies patent law ought to promote, 
harming the quality of this area’s legal development.79 In many ways, formalism is 
antithetical to any refined technology- and industry-specific patent law. 
With this articulation of the district courts’ shortcomings, the next section 
discusses how to improve the system of patent litigation, by fostering a mutually 
beneficial relationship between the district courts and the Federal Circuit, thereby 
enhancing the technology- and industry-specific development of patent law. 
C. Improving the District Courts 
Given that patent litigation is a complex system with the district courts as 
one of its critical components, it is crucial to improve these courts. Bettering the 
courts’ decision-making capabilities in patent cases and finding ways to harness 
their institutional strengths vis-à-vis the Federal Circuit is critical to fostering 
accurate technology- and industry-specific patent rules that foster innovation. This 
section addresses how a beneficial symbiosis might be fostered between the 
district courts and the Federal Circuit. This section’s suggestions are illustrative of 
improvements that might be made, rather than exhaustive. These suggestions 
nonetheless coalesce to focus on turning the district courts into patent laboratories 
for the Federal Circuit, in the sense that they should carefully collect case, 
technological, and industry facts in each patent case; strive to apply the most 
appropriate legal rules to those facts; and serve up these factual and legal 
determinations to the Federal Circuit for further refinement. In turn, the Federal 
Circuit ought to defer to the district courts’ factual findings so long as they are not 
clearly erroneous and use its bird’s-eye view to refine technology- and industry-
specific patent law. 
In light of district courts’ importance, a first step toward enhancing the 
quality of patent litigation is to improve the decision making in which those courts 
engage. In other work, I recommend taking account of patentography—the 
geography of patent disputes—to improve district courts’ factual and legal 
decision making.80 There, I propose making patent suits proper only in the district 
 
77. Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 802–04. 
78. Id. at 802–03; accord Rai, supra note 52, at 1037. 
79. Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 803. For other critiques of the Federal Circuit’s formalism, see 
Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 123 (2005); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003). 
80. Fromer, supra note 5. 
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for the principal place of business of any of the defendants in a case (with a safety 
valve to avoid due process concerns in a minute number of cases).81 Beyond 
nearly eliminating forum shopping, so constraining venue should improve district 
courts’ decision making by tending to cluster patent cases of particular 
technologies or industries in a limited number of districts. Industries tend to 
cluster around geographic areas, such as the pharmaceutical industry in New 
Jersey and the software industry in Silicon Valley and the Boston and Seattle 
areas.82 Because of industries’ natural geographic clusterings, lawsuits that must be 
filed in defendants’—industry players’—principal place of business would mean 
that more industry- or technology-specific patent suits ought to coalesce in 
districts with relevant industry clusters. Under my proposed venue rules, it would 
likely entail, for example, clusters of pharmaceutical patents suits in the District of 
New Jersey and software patent suits in the Northern District of California, the 
District of Massachusetts, and the Western District of Washington.83 A simulation 
of the hypothetical distribution of all of the actual utility patent cases filed in 2005 
under my proposal confirms such clustering effects for numerous technologies 
and industries.84 
When this clustering effect obtains, a handful of district courts would 
adjudicate many patent cases in particular technologies or industries. The 
proficiency they would thus develop would help them serve both as skilled fact 
finders in developing the case record and as patent laboratories for tailoring patent 
law to promote innovation in their particular clustered technologies or 
industries.85 Moreover, judges, juries, and other legal actors located in an industry 
or technology cluster are likely to have more background knowledge about that 
industry or technology than jurors located in arbitrary areas.86 This better 
understanding might, for example, be because they work in that area, have 
neighbors or family working in that area, read more stories about that area in the 
local newspaper, or possess tacit knowledge.87 It is more useful to harness this 
typically elevated background knowledge in a district with industry clusters than to 
locate patent suits in arbitrary locations, such as the current preponderance of 
software patent cases in the “no bytes’ land” of the Eastern District of Texas and 
 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Court Locator, http://www.uscourts.gov/courtlinks/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2011) 
(providing a map of federal district courts). 
84. Fromer, supra note 5. 
85. I argue also that this system is preferable to a set of district courts specializing in patent 
law, as some have proposed. Rai, supra note 43. What patent law needs for more accurate, efficient, 
and thoughtful judicial resolution of patent cases is not a set of district courts handling only patent 
cases, but enough district courts that, in addition to seeing their usual host of cases, tend to see 
enough patent cases of particular industries or technologies. Fromer, supra note 5. 
86. Fromer, supra note 5. 
87. Id. 
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pharmaceutical cases in the District of Delaware.88 
Harnessing patentography would go a long way toward improving district 
courts’ factual and legal determinations. However, it would probably make more 
marked improvements with regard to bench trials than jury trials. Even with 
average elevated background knowledge, jurors almost never have the repeated 
exposure to patent cases that district court judges would. Moreover, even if jurors 
would have average elevated background knowledge were patent suits to cluster 
by industry or technology, some number of jurors would still have little to no such 
background knowledge. There is, therefore, good reason to worry about jurors’ 
abilities to decide the ever-critical facts in a patent case properly. 
One way to protect the system of patent litigation from these 
unknowledgeable jurors would be to mandate that district courts use special-
verdict forms in jury trials of patent cases.89 A mandated special-verdict form 
specifying separately the factual issues the jury must determine would have two 
important benefits. First, it would crisply communicate to the jury each factual 
issue they must determine, which would foster justifiable findings.90 This 
communication ought to obviate the need for complicated instructions to the jury 
on the relevant patent law.91 Second, if each factual issue is sufficiently articulated 
separately, post-trial and appellate review of the jurors’ individual factual 
conclusions would be eased. Pertinently, a special verdict with sufficiently 
differentiated issues would permit a reviewing court a (minor) peek inside the 
black box of jury findings by enabling surgical reversals of jury error rather than 
wholesale reversals requiring full-blown new trials.92 
Assuming these changes would lead to improved fact-finding in the district 
courts (as well as better tailored legal conclusions), it would be productive to 
ensure that the Federal Circuit grants high degrees of deference to the district 
courts’ factual findings.93 In that vein, those issues of patent law that have been 
labeled legal but are principally factual—like claim construction—ought to be 
relabeled as factual questions. Additionally, those factual issues informing legal 
issues—like the elements of nonobviousness—should also be granted sufficient 
deference. 
 
88. Id. 
89. See Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 723–24 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (encouraging the use of special-verdict forms (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a))). Now, the use of 
special-verdict forms in these cases is permissive. McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
90. Structural Rubber Prods., 749 F.2d at 724. 
91. R.H. Baker & Co. v. Smith-Blair, Inc., 331 F.2d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 1964). 
92. McGinley, 262 F.3d at 1356. 
93. Congress might specify the degree of deference required for the various patent issues. Cf. 
Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907, 919 
(2004) (discussing how Congress might mandate the Federal Circuit’s deference to the PTO on 
particular legal questions). 
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A renewed focus on fact-finding in the district courts and the Federal 
Circuit’s deference to those facts absent clear error might also encourage the filing 
of amicus curiae briefs in patent cases in the district courts. By highlighting key 
aspects of the technology and industry at issue, these briefs would assist the 
district courts determining the relevant facts with accuracy. 
By using these and other techniques, the district courts’ power in finding 
facts—of each case, the associated patented technology, and the relevant 
industry—could be maximized. The district courts would thereby serve as patent 
laboratories for the Federal Circuit, by queuing up relevant facts and doing their 
best to apply patent law accurately to promote innovation for the relevant 
technology and industry. The Federal Circuit—with its expertise in the law of 
patents—would supervise these patent laboratories, by providing guidance and 
refining patent law. 
CONCLUSION 
In their book, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley articulate an essential insight 
about the necessity for technology and industry specificity in patent law, so as to 
encourage the various types of innovation that happen in different industries and 
with different technologies. To them, the locus of technology- and industry-
specific development of patent law ought to be in the courts. In this regard, they 
focus almost exclusively on the Federal Circuit. In this Article, I supplement their 
work by arguing that the district courts ought to be an integral part of their story, 
given their important role in patent litigation. Although district courts currently 
underperform in their handling of patent cases, they can be improved so as to turn 
them into reliable patent laboratories, interacting beneficially with the Federal 
Circuit to refine and improve patent law in technology- and industry-specific ways. 
 
 
 
